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Abstract This is the second symposium of the same title “Logic and Economics” in
this journal and has four papers studying the issues expressed in the subtitle. In this
introduction, the guest editor first describes a general perspective for this symposium
and then explains each paper from this perspective. Finally, a few remarks are given.
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JEL Classification D00 · D80
This is the second symposium issue of the same title “Logic and Economics” in this
journal. The first symposium (Kaneko 2002, vol.19) did not have the subtitle “Inter-
actions between Subjective Thinking and Objective Worlds”; the papers in the first
symposium studied one direction, specifically, the logic approach to economics/game
theory. After the first symposium, we have had more developments on the issues
expressed by the subtitle. This symposium presents four papers studying various
aspects on interactions between subjective thinking and objective worlds.
These interactions are in two directions illustrated as
The direction → is typically the main engine in economics/game theory, for exam-
ple, utility maximization. The other direction ← is also considered in economics/game
theory such as in economics of information and extensive game theory. These def-
initely belong to central themes of economics/game theory in that we, economists,
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game theorists, and social scientists in general, target the study of human activities
and their mutual interactions in socio-economic situations.
However, we notice a strong tendency in the present economics/game theory for
those interactions to be treated as interpretational supplements outside the process
of real analysis. One reason is the left-hand side is undeveloped; therefore, it relies
upon interpretations of theoretic apparatuses. A development of a theory on the left-
hand side could provide many different ways to discuss the interactions. Now, it is
the time to reflect over bases for related fields and to take direct attacks to target
problems. The four papers in this symposium can be viewed as explorations into such
problems.
In the literature of economics/game theory, we find a dominant approach to
interactions in Diagram 1, based on the states of the world and information par-
titions, represented by Aumann (1999). The research strategy and perspective for
this symposium are fundamentally different from this tradition; our research strat-
egy is, rather, reminiscent of Hilbert’s axiomatic approach (or method, formalism,
axiomatics) to mathematics. It would be helpful to have some discussions on the
differences and status of our research strategy relative to the views of Aumann and
Hilbert.
An information partition model is regarded as a precise description of the world
including the distribution of individual beliefs/knowledge among the players. Aumann
(1999) gave one extreme view that each single state ω of the world is a complete
description of the world, and each player obtains only partial information from ω.
Thus,ω is already a universal description containing all elements of the world including
the distribution of knowledge/beliefs of the players, and the partiality of each player’s
knowledge is described by an information partition of the set of all possible states of the
world . This approach involves the intrinsic difficulty that when interpersonal (e.g.,
common) knowledge is discussed in this framework, the information partitions for the
players as well as  need to be interpersonally (commonly, respectively) known. See
Gul (1998) for critical assessments of this view.
We do not take this view: First of all, we forget a “complete description of the
world” and even “a state of the world”. Instead, we start with a player’s partial basic
beliefs, which are simply partial. A player has only basic beliefs described in a sym-
bolic manner, in order to avoid set-theoretic structures sneaking into our theory, but
he is given a logical inference ability to derive conclusions from his beliefs. From our
point of view, the information partition model is a special case of an extensive game
(without a specification of payoffs), which is viewed simply as a theory of information
transmissions and local moves. Based on this view, Kaneko and Kline (2008b) devel-
oped an alternative formulation of an extensive game called “an information protocol”;
it will be discussed in the second paper of this symposium.
To discuss Hilbert’s axiomatic approach, let us recall the prevalent tradition in the
present mathematics;1 here, we take Bourbaki’s (1966) axiomatics as its representa-
tive. Hilbert’s axiomatic approach differs from Bourbaki’s in that the former stresses
deductive structures from axioms to consequences by symbolic logical inferences,
1 See Kline (1972, Chap. 51), for more discussions on Hilbert.
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while the latter takes an axiomatic system to categorize the set of all contents (models)
for the axiomatic system. We make an analogy to our research strategy by interpreting
Hilbert’s approach as dictating, more generally, that any intellectual discourse should
be presented as a form of an axiomatic form consisting of definitions, axioms, and
inference rules. This is illustrated in Diagram 2. A derivation of a consequence from
definitions and axioms by logical inferences should be bounded and is only partially
possible; if this was complete, our view would collapse to the categorization of possible
contents for the definitions and axioms in the discourse.
Aumann’s interpretation of the information partition model is along the same line
as Bourbaki’s axiomatics in that an axiomatic system determines the set-theoretic
contents. However, Aumann is much more simplistic than Bourbaki; Aumann claims
all the details of the world by a simple information partition model, while Bour-
baki has tried to execute a unification of all mathematical fields in an axiomatic
set-theoretic manner. On the other hand, Hilbert’s axiomatic approach is radical and
foundational in various senses in its symbolic formalistic method. At the same time,
he was pragmatic in that he aimed to capture almost all mathematical discourses and
their details in mathematics contemporaneous to him. The guest editor thinks that his
basic idea is applicable to each societal situation and that separations between sym-
bolic expressions and their associate meanings are crucial for studies of societal prob-
lems. In these senses, we take a general version of Hilbert’s approach while keeping
his spirit.
Here, we point out several differences between our research strategy and Hilbert’s.
Individual basic beliefs should be partial, maybe, very partial, and logical infer-
ence abilities are bounded. Also, those can be less sophisticated than a mathematical
axiomatic theory, for example, independence of axioms is an important criterion for
Hilbert’s, but individual beliefs may not be independent; overlapping beliefs may be
adopted as basic beliefs—once some are already derived, they can be used as basic
beliefs. Even inconsistent beliefs may be allowed, though we need a careful and mean-
ingful notion of “inconsistency”. Also, as seen in Diagram 1, individual basic beliefs
are from outer objective worlds rather than well-thought mathematical axioms. This
leads us to question experiential sources for basic beliefs, which is also targeted in
this symposium.
Keeping the above comments in mind, we now go to explanations of the four papers.
The first paper, by Tai-Wei Hu, takes the frequentist view and reformulates expected
utility theory, so as to connect it to the outer objective worlds. The second paper,
by J. Jude Kline and myself, more directly studies the interactions in Diagram 1:
Causalities in both directions are considered. The third and fourth papers are directly
related to Hilbert’ axiomatic approach, though the logical systems adopted in those
papers follow the Gentezen-style; Gerhard Gentzen was a student of David Hilbert.
The third paper, by Kline, studies logical inferences required for possible resolutions of
the muddy children puzzle. It examines the revision process of beliefs and decisions by
interactions with the other children. The fourth paper, by Nobu-Yuki Suzuki, modifies
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the logical system adopted in Kline’s paper so as to capture constructive reasoning.
This sounds unrelated to the above interactions, but the evaluation of unconstructive
components involved in the left-hand side of Diagram 1 is critical for our further
research activities.
Now, we go to more detailed comments on the four papers.
(1) “Expected utility theory from the frequentist perspective” by Hu (2013)
The initiators of expected utility theory, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944),
emphasized that “probability” should be taken as expressing the frequency of an event.
It is, however, now typical, following Savage (1954), to take it as the subjective con-
cept expressing some “propensity” of a given event. This view is influential in many
ways in economics/game theory, but without having a clear experiential notion of the
“propensity”, it will be difficult to view expected utility theory from the perspective of
Diagram 1. One way to have a connection between expected utility theory and expe-
riential worlds is to return to the frequentist perspective. Paper (1) provides, indeed, a
formulation of expected utility theory taking the frequency interpretation explicitly.
Specifically, (1) considers a preference relation over the set of sequences of out-
comes, which are possible histories in the past and continue to the future. It provides
axioms on the preference relation over such sequences. The axioms are parallel to the
standard expected utility theory such as those in Fishburn (1970). Then, (1) presents
a representation theorem so that the long-run frequency in a given sequence can be
a substitute for “probability” in the standard expected utility theory. This approach
can also incorporate the “randomness” concept due to von Mises (1981). In sum,
expected utility theory and the frequentist concept of probability are reconciled from
the experiential point of view.
(2) “Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behav-
ior” by Kaneko and Kline (2013)
This is a paper on inductive game theory (IGT). IGT was initiated by Kaneko and
Matsui (1999), and its perspective was spelled out in Kaneko and Kline (2008a). It
studies a derivation of an individual view from his past experiences, which process
is called “induction”. In the standard economics/game theory, it is presumed that the
structure of an economic/game situation is known to each player. In the case of an
extensive game, the game tree together with information sets is assumed to be known.
Here, a difficulty manifests itself once we ask what an information set describes in the
extensive game. In this theory, information sets are also assumed to include players’
memory abilities.
IGT distinguishes between the information a player obtains and his memory ability.
This distinction enables us to treat experiences in a meaningful manner. Then, paper (2)
considers how a player may construct a view (understanding) based on accumulated
experiences through limited memory abilities. From this perspective, (2) first describes
the objective situation in terms of “an information protocol” and a “memory function”
for each player. An information protocol is an alternative description of an extensive
game, while avoiding the set-theoretic description of information sets. See Kaneko and
Kline (2008b) for relationships between information protocols and extensive games.
The memory function gives some partial sequences of information pieces to a player,
which the player may accumulate.
123
Symposium: Logic and economics 5
In (2), the repetitive occurrences of an information protocol with memory functions
are considered. Here, three different kinds of memories are involved: Memories of the
first kind are temporal within each occurrence of the information protocol, which are
described by a memory function. The second is short-term memories remaining in the
mind of a player for some limited duration, and the last ones are long-term memories
fixed in his mind. For a more precise description of these different memories, see
Akiyama et al. (2013).
A player constructs his view (understanding) of the situation, combining the accu-
mulated long-term memories. Then, he uses his view to revise his current behavior
pattern, and starts playing the revised behavior, still possibly subject to trials-errors.
Through such a revision process, he may improve his view as well as his utility level.
After several revisions, his view may be more correct and his behavior gets closer to
some equilibrium. Nevertheless, great partiality may still remain in such a view and
resulting equilibrium.
(3) “Evaluations of epistemic components for resolving the muddy children puzzle”
by Kline (2013).
In this paper, the emphasis moves to subjective thinking. The paper takes the muddy
children puzzle as a target problem and analyzes it using the logical system GLEF
developed in Kaneko and Suzuki (2002). The muddy children puzzle has been studied
in economics/game theory and epistemic logic. Differing from these literatures, how-
ever, paper (3) aims to study the problem of logical reasoning required for resolving
the puzzle.
In economics/game theory, the puzzle is analyzed typically in terms of an informa-
tion partition model, and in epistemic logic, it is studied in a semantic manner. In the
former, the logical reasoning is purely interpretational, and in the latter, it is still quite
indirect, that is, in a semantic manner. Although resolutions have been discussed, it
would be difficult to see what are really required for a resolution of the puzzle. For
example, the typical assumption involved in those resolutions is that the entire situ-
ation is common knowledge among the children. Paper (3) explicitly formalizes the
situation taking the 3-child case and gives a resolution, without requiring common
knowledge. The main point of (3) is to rigorously evaluate required components for a
resolution.
It shows that the epistemic interactive depth required for a resolution is 3 for the
3-child case. Also, it gives a minimal set of beliefs for a resolution, and its minimality
is proved. The paper suggests a possible extension to the n-child case.
Paper (3) formulates the situation as a dynamics. It is not formulated as one log-
ical system, but logical reasoning is made each time after revising the beliefs. This
treatment may be criticized in that the dynamic epistemic logic approach (cf., van
Ditmarsch et al. 2008) can treat the entire process as one logical system. The guest
editor thinks, however, that the separate dynamics is rather a natural treatment, since
the process involves each child’s inaction caused by the unprovability of his face being
muddy: If this step is included in one logical system, it would mix the inside viewpoint




Paper (3) adopts the logical system GLEF, which is a subsystem of finitary multi-
modal logic KDn. The logical systems S4n and/or S5n are more prevalently used
than KDn; the former is obtained from KDn by adding Axioms T (Truthfulness) and
Axiom 4 (Positive Introspection), and the latter is obtained additionally by adopting
Axiom 5 (Negative Introspection)(cf. Fagin et al. 1995; Meyer and van der Hoek
1995). Those are stronger systems, with respect to provability, than KDn, a fortiori,
than GLEF. A stronger logic would be easier for obtaining positive results, but logic
GLEF would be more useful in evaluating provability in both positive and negative
manners. One example of such studies is Kaneko and Suzuki (2003), where a lot of
meta-theorems (evaluating provability) are obtained for GLEF. Paper (3) makes use of
such meta-theorems for the analysis of the muddy children puzzle.
Logic GLEF may still be regarded as involving an undesired strong assumption;
some non-constructive aspects caused by the base logic of GLEF being classical logic.
Decision making in economics/game theory requires a player to have a constructive
method for a decision. In the logic literature, intuitionistic logic is a representative
of constructive logical systems. The fourth paper weakens the base logic of GLEF to
intuitionistic logic.
(4) “Semantics for intuitionistic epistemic logics of shallow depths for game theory”
by Suzuki (2013).
The logical system IGEF presented in (4) is obtained by imposing only one constraint
on every inference rule in GLEF; the same constraint is imposed only on the epistemic
inference rule in GLEF In this sense, from the proof-theoretic point of view, IGEF is
simpler and even more coherent as a logical system than GLEF. However, the cost
for this restriction is a complication of its semantics. The semantic framework for is
a GLEF variant of Kripke-semantics, and its main structure is accessibility relations
representing how each player thinks about the others’ epistemic possibilities. For
IGEF, the semantic framework needs another accessibility relation to represent the
intuitionistic restriction. Paper (4) proves the soundness-completeness theorem for
IGEF with respect to the modified semantics; that is, provability in IGEF is equivalent
to the validity in the semantics.
The essential difference between classical logic and intuitionistic logic can be
viewed as the provability of the law of excluded middle, (¬A)∨ A, where A is
any formula. It is always provable in classical logic, but it is not necessarily in
intuitionistic logic. This leads further to the difference that the former is not nec-
essarily constructive, but the latter is. It has been customary in economics/game the-
ory to discuss the existence of an equilibrium or the non-emptiness of a solution
concept. However, neither logical inferences required nor constructive ways of reason-
ing are typically discussed. In paper (4), an example is given to show that the existence
of a recommendation is a mere existence claim but does not provide a specific choice.
Aside from the main difference described above, papers (3) and (4) adopt slightly
different rules to define formulae. Indeed, (4) adopts the traditional way in the logic
literature that a formula is defined to be a sequence of symbols, while (3) uses the
set-theoretic notation, which enables us to abbreviate some rules. However, they are
regarded as essentially the same, and the choice should be made depending upon
convenience for purposes.
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The logical systems in (3) and (4) are formulated as the Gentzen-style sequent
calculi, different from either the Hilbert-style proof-theoretic system or the Kripke-
semantics (cf. Kaneko 2002 for those). Since the Gentzen-style approach may not be
familiar to the reader, we give some explanations on the relationships between these
approaches.
Both Hilbert-style and Gentzen-style logics are proof-theoretic systems, mean-
ing that they formulate the concept of a proof based on logical inferences as sym-
bol manipulations. The Kripke-semantics treats the meanings (contents) of symbolic
expressions. With respect to provability, the Hilbert-style and Gentzen-style can be
equivalent, though they are different systems and have different meta-properties such
as the cut-elimination theorem due to Gentzen (1935). The Hilbert-style approach is
connected with the Kripke-semantics in terms of validity. This connection is called
the “soundness-completeness theorem”. Then, we can connect the Gentzen-style proof
theory to the Kripke-semantics. The relationships are illustrated in Diagram 3.
Although these systems can be deductively equivalent, they are different as systems.
A merit of the Gentzen-style, relative to Hilbert-style, is that it treats logical inferences
in a more explicit manner. Also, it enables us to evaluate provability in both a positive
and a negative manner. A demerit is that a system is larger than the Hilbert-style
counterpart. In the beginning, it may take more time to become familiar to the Gentzen-
style than to the Hilbert-style. The basic principle for Kripke-semantics (semantics in
general) is entirely different from proof theory, and it is to invalidate a statement by
giving a counter model. This is connected to proof theory in that the completeness
theorem asserts that if there is no counter model, it would be provable, and the converse
is soundness.
A reader should not think that since they are deductively equivalent, a choice of one
system could be enough. Those equivalences are with respect to the entire provable for-
mulae and the entire valid formulae. For provability, some theorems are easily obtained
but some need long inference processes to be proved. For validity, some are validated
by small classes of models and some need large ones. From our research prospective,
we should be interested in how small or large processes are required for some specific
problems: If such processes are astronomical, they might be irrelevant for real people.
We should not forget the remark stated just before Diagram 2. After all, such equiva-
lences between the systems are needed to avoid an arbitrary choice of a logical system.
Anyhow, it would be informative to have three different systems. Epistemological
problems are closely related to our ordinary lives and intellectual activities, but are
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too far from being able to study them simply by reflecting on them in a simplistic
manner; an analogy is that we are using a stomach every day, but we need anatomical,
medical, and physiological knowledge to understand its function. It would be useful
to keep different approaches to study epistemological problems. The three different
approaches could play complementary roles for them.
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